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case 
was served an offenses while 
federal criminal proceedings. Nall in custody in 
until his sentencing for the state offenses, at which time he was remanded to the 
of the Department of Correction. In the original judgment of conviction, 
district court granted Mr. Nall 316 days of credit prejudgment time served-provided 
that he did not receive that same credit on his federal sentence. The State and Mr. Nall 
both filed motions and briefing on the credit issue, and the district court issued an 
amended judgment with zero credit for Mr. Nail's prejudgment incarceration. Mr. Nall 
now appeals from the district court's amended judgment and the memorandum decision 
denying credit for prejudgment served. argues that the plain 
his 
despite his concurrent incarceration federal charges. 
On July 9, 201 the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Nall committed 
the crimes of conspiracy to commit burglary and unlawful possession of a firearm, along 
with a sentencing enhancement for commission a felony intent 
gang activity. (R, pp.6-9.) An arrest warrant was issued the same day. (R., pp.11 2.) 
Mr. Nall was served with the arrest warrant on July 23, 2013. (R, p.12.) At the time of 
service, Mr. Nall was in the Ada County Jail on a U.S. Marshal "no bond" hold for 
charges in a federal case. (R., 134; see R, p.83.) the 
1 
u bond" hold was a 
, p.18.) 
Sometime arraignment, Mr. apparently went into the custody of 
the "U.S. Marshall Service at the Ada County Jail" because, on August 6, 2013, the 
State filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Mr. Nail's appearance at the 
preliminary hearing for the state criminal proceedings. (R., pp.28-29.) The magistrate 
granted the State's motion. (R., p.29.) Although the precise date is unclear from the 
record, "[t]he federal hold was converted to a detainer so that Ada County could take 
temporary custody of" Mr. Nall for the state criminal proceedings. (R., p.134; see also 
, p.83, State's A.) 
Mr. Nall was sentenced in the federal case in August of 2013. (R., pp.134-35.) 
federal for the period of 
1, 2013, through August 21, 2013." (R., pp.134-35.) 
On September 6, 2013, the State filed an Amended Complaint, alleging an 
additional crime of supplying a firearm to a criminal gang member. (R., pp.35-38.) On 
December 11, 2013, Mr. Nall waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound 
him over to district court. (R., pp.47-51.) The State filed an Information charging 
Mr. Nall with conspiracy to commit burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, and 
supplying a firearm to a criminal gang member, plus the sentencing enhancement for 
commission of a felony with the intent to promote gang activity. (R., pp.52-55.) On 
February 26, 2014, Mr. Nall pied guilty to conspiracy to commit burglary and supplying a 
1 Similar issues are raised in State v. Brand, No. 43441, and State v. Martin, No. 43297. 
2 
a a 
1.) 
. ) State argued Mr. Nall was not 
credit for prejudgment time served because his prejudgment incarceration was not 
"caused" by the state charges, but rather the federal charges. (R., pp.79-82.) At the 
sentencing hearing, on June 3, 2014, the State again argued Mr. Nall was not entitled to 
credit (Tr. Vol. II, p.34, L.1 35, L.3.) Mr. Nall's counsel argued that Mr. Nall was 
entitled to credit on either his state or federal sentence. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, L.7-p.10, L.2.) If 
Mr. Nall did not get the credit on his federal sentence, Mr. Nail's counsel informed the 
district court that he would file a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule ("Rule 35") 
to add the credit to Mr. Na!l's state sentence. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.10, Ls.3-14.) Mr. Nall made 
a general request for credit during his statement sentencing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, 1 
1 
The district ruled Mr. Nall was not entitled to credit because had 
"been held by the federal authorities." (Tr. Vol. II, p.33, L.9-p.34, L.21.) district court 
provided, however, that if the federal authorities did not give Mr. Nall credit "for the time 
spent in custody here locally as a result of the State case," the district court would grant 
Mr. Nall credit on his state sentence. (Tr. Vol. II, p.35, L.20-p.36, L.13.) On June 5, 
2015, the district court issued a Judgment of Conviction and Commitment consistent 
with its oral ruling: "If Defendant does not receive credit for time served in Federal 
2 There are four transcripts in the record on the appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, 
contains the entry of plea hearing and the April 1, 2015, status hearing. The second, 
cited as Volume II, contains Day One of the sentencing hearing. The third, cited as 
Volume Ill, contains Day Two of the sentencing hearing. The fourth, cited as Volume IV, 
3 
a se 
court interpreted as a timely "request credit for time served" pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 and I.C. § 18-309. (R., pp.96-97; Aug. R., Def.'s Letter.) The district 
court also received an Application for Public Defender from Mr. Nall a few weeks later. 
(R., p.96.) Upon receipt of these two documents, the district court appointed counsel to 
represent Mr. Nall on his request for credit for time served. (R., p.97.) 
On November 3, 201 the State filed a Motion to Clarify Credit for Time Served. 
(R., pp.98-99.) The State requested that the district court issue an Amended Judgment 
of Conviction stating that Mr. Nall was entitled to zero days credit towards his state 
sentence because the federal authorities had given Mr. Nall credit for his prejudgment 
incarceration. (R., pp.98-99.) 
The district court held a status conference on April 1, 201 (R., 105; see 
generally Tr. Vol. I, pp.42-48.) At the status conference, Mr. Nall's counsel submitted 
that the Court's recent opinion in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (Feb. 9, 2015), "opens 
the door" for Mr. Nall to receive credit for his state sentence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.42, L.20-p.43, 
11.) The district court determined that another Rule 35 motion "would be appropriate" 
and set a briefing schedule to address the issue. (Tr. Vol. I, p.44, L.25-p.45, L.11, p.45, 
Ls.17-23, p.46, Ls.13-19, p.47, Ls.8-21; R., p.106.) Mr. Nall then filed another Rule 35 
contains a hearing on the State's Motion to Clarify and Defendant's Rule 35 Motion, 
held on June 1, 2015. 
4 
motion 
the district the 
1 
time served. 
under (Tr. Vol. 
After 
L. 
L.5.) On July 16, 2015, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
ruling that Mr. Nall was not entitled to for time served towards his 
Mr. Nail's incarceration was not "caused by" the state proceedings, 
rather the federal proceedings. (R., pp.133-39.) Further, the district court 
determined that Owens did not provide support for Mr. Nall's position. (R., p.138.) Also 
on July 16, 2015, the district court issued an Amended Judgment of Conviction and 
Commitment, which stated in relevant part, "Defendant shall receive credit for zero (0) 
toward the fixed portion of his sentence." (R., pp.141--44.) Mr. Nall timely 
from 
credit prejudgment . (R., pp.146--47.) 
3 Mr. Nall recognizes that this Rule 35 motion requested "leniency"-not explicitly credit 
for time served-but his supporting brief discussed only this credit issue. (R., pp.108-
16.) Further, Mr. Nall's pro se letter from July 28, 2014, was interpreted by the district 
court as a request for credit for time served. (R., pp.96-97.) 
5 
6 
service of an arrest Nall was incarcerated in the Ada 
Jail for the entirety of his state criminal proceedings. He was also incarcerated for 
federal criminal charges. Despite the concurrent incarceration for federal charges, 
Nall remained in custody for the state criminal charges until the entry of a judgment 
of conviction. Thus, following the service of the state arrest warrant, Mr. Nall's 
incarceration was "for the offense for which judgment of conviction was entered." 
I.C. § 18-309(1). Pursuant to this plain, unambiguous language of I.C. § 18-309(1), the 
district court was required to give Mr. Nall credit for his prejudgment served. 
Mr. Nall submits that the district court's failure do so was contrary LC. § 18-309(1) 
in error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Court exercises over statutory it is a 
question of law." State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015). 
C. As An Unambiguous Statute, The Plain Language Of LC. § 18-309 Mandates 
Credit For Prejudgment Time Served For An Offense Despite Concurrent 
Incarcerations For Other Offenses Or Cases 
Idaho Code section 18-309 governs the receipt of credit for prejudgment time 
served. Owens, 158 Idaho at 3. It provides in relevant part: "In computing the term of 
imprisonment, the person against whom the judgment was entered, shall recelve credit 
in the judgment any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such 
7 
was or an was 
§ 
in or 
to "Owens, 158 3 (citing Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 
(1983)). 
The plain language of I.C. § 18-309(1) is unambiguous. Id. "Statutory 
interpretation begins with the statute's plain language." Id. at 3. The Court "considers 
statute as a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings." Id. 
"When the statute's language is unambiguous, the legislature's clearly expressed intent 
be given effect, and [the Court does] not need to go beyond the statute's plain 
language to consider other rules of statutory construction." Id. This case involves the 
interpretation of the second phrase of I.C. § 18-309(1 ): "if such incarceration was for the 
or an included offense for which 
language of 
mandates credit for prejudgment 
judgment was entered." I.C. § 18-309(1 ). 
phrase, it is § 18-309 
served an offense regardless of any 
concurrent incarceration for other offenses or cases. 
This second phrase is the only limit on the mandate that the district court give a 
defendant credit for his time served. Owens, 158 Idaho at 4. As explained by the Court 
in Owens: 
First, Idaho Code section 18-309 mandates that a court gives a defendant 
credit for his time served because the statute states that a person "shall" 
receive credit. Second, section 18-309 specifies that a person "shall 
4 The legislature amended I.C. § 18-309 on March 25, 2015, effective July 1, 2015, to 
add a second subsection relating to credit for "any period of incarceration served as a 
condition of probation" under a withheld judgment or suspended sentence. Ch. 99, § 1, 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws 240, 240. The Legislature did not amend the language at issue 
here. Prior to the 2015 amendment, the last amendment to I.C. § 18-309 occurred in 
1996. Ch. 168, § 1, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 552, 553. 
8 
on 
which the judgment was 
(second this condition "simply the type of 
incarceration that a defendant gets credit for." Id. "[A]s long as the defendant's 
prejudgment jail time was for 'the offense' the defendant was convicted of and 
sentenced for, the court gives the defendant that credit." Id. If this condition is met, the 
"does not limit that credit in any way." Id. 
Based on the statute's plain language, Mr. Nall is entitled to credit for his 
prejudgment incarceration for the state offenses. The district court must give Mr. Nall 
that credit long as [his] prejudgment jail time was for 'the offense' the defendant was 
convicted of and for." Id. Mr. Nall was in custody for the state offenses from 
was the on July 201 was 
on June 201 (R., pp.12, 85.) Even though Nall was already 
incarcerated federal criminal proceedings during this time, the fact remains that 
Nall was incarcerated for "the offense[s]" of conspiracy to commit burglary and 
unlawful possession of a firearm after he was served with the arrest warrant. LC. § 18-
309(1). Nothing in the plain language of the statute calls for the modification this 
condition when the defendant is already or concurrently incarcerated for federal 
charges. 
Certainly, the legislature could have further conditioned the receipt of credit in 
circumstances v,hen other concurrent incarcerations exist, including federai custody. in 
Owens, for example, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a 
9 
1 ), 
that on 
receipt of credit would be an alteration of the statute's unambiguous language: "If 
legislature had delineated credit for incarceration 'each or another 
description other than 'the offense,' the outcome would be different." Id. at The same 
principle applies here. Another description other than "the offense" could have limited 
in circumstances when multiple offenses or cases contribute to the defendant's 
prejudgment incarceration. For instance, legislature could have limited the credit to 
on only the original or first offense causing the defendant's incarceration. 
legislature has not placed such limitations in the 
is 
such as 
custody. 
the is for "the 
or sentences, 
Instead, the only 
other 
or federal 
Contrary to the plain language of I § 18-309(1 ), Mr. Nall submits the Court 
of Appeals has read additional language into the statute to further limit a defendant's 
receipt of credit. The Court of Appeals has interpreted the "offense" condition in 
I. C. § 18-309( 1) as follows: 
The statute's phrase "if such incarceration was for the offense or an 
included offense for which the judgment was entered" means that the right 
to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a 
consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the 
sentence is imposed. State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993); 
State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765 (Ct. App. 1989). Thus, there must be a 
causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order for the 
incarceration to be "for" the offense, as the term is used in I.C. § 18-309. 
10 
is 
1 
Through causal 
of 
. In 
the Court 
Hom, 124 
condition 
is in conflict with the 
only if 
causes the prejudgment incarceration, but also if the offense is the original or exclusive 
cause of prejudgment in State v. 120 Idaho 1 
In the 
were 
Id. 
Id. 
were sentenced. Id. 
defendants' guilty 
defendants' 
federal 
when arrest 
guilty 
after federal sentencing, the 
the state" answer to state 
and sentencing the charges, 
defendants sought for time served from the time they were arrested in the 
federal case to time of state or, the time they served 
"temporary custody" to the time of state sentencing. Id. at 443. First, the Court of 
Appeals held that the defendants were not entitled credit on their state sentences for 
either the time served in federal custody pending federal proceedings or 
on their federal sentences. Id. Second, and most relevant 
Appeals held that 
time served 
Court 
"in the 
the time of 
because they were 
proceedings. 
for 
The Court of Appeals has continued to apply this strict test to deny for time 
similar situations. See Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68-69 (no credit because 
already in custody for charges arising out of another county when he was 
served when arrest warrant); Hom, 124 Idaho at 850-51 (no credit when defendant was 
"already being detained as a consequence of charges in other counties"); Hale, 116 
Idaho at 765 (no credit for defendant's original offense when defendant was arrested for 
second, unrelated offense but unable to post bond in either case). 5 As evidenced by 
the Court of Appeals' causal effect test does much more than if the 
prejudgment was which judgment 
was entered." I.C. § 18-309(1 ). The Court Appeals' requires that the defendant's 
prejudgment incarceration was originally or exclusively for that offense. Under the Court 
5 Hale, 116 Idaho 763, is one of the first cases in which the Court of Appeals delineated 
this causal effect test. The Court of Appeals stated: 
An entitlement to credit under I.C. § 18-309 depends upon the answer to a 
simple inquiry: was the defendant's incarceration upon the offense for 
which he was sentenced? If a particular period of confinement served prior 
to the imposition of sentence is not attributable to the charge or conduct 
for which a sentence is to be imposed, the offender is not entitled to credit 
for such confinement; neither does the sentencing judge err by denying 
credit under such circumstances. 
Id. at 765. The Court of Appeals supported this test with case law from other 
jurisdictions. Id. (citing cases from Colorado, California, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, and North Dakota). 
12 
or 
This a credit for 
any 
already provided in the statute's plain language. Owens, 158 Idaho The 
condition on credit is that the defendant is incarcerated for "the offense." I . § 1 
1 ). There is no of any other conditions in such as the 
or concurrent sentences, multiple counts, or custody. 
that Court Appeals has gone beyond the plain language of 
Nall 
statute 
improperly restrict the mandatory award of credit. See Owens, 158 Idaho at 
(rejecting the interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (Ct. App. 
1 which had "incorrectly looked at legislative intent" to the 
cl we v 
893 (2011) (legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should consulted 
clearly intent of legislature in unambiguous 
The existence concurrent incarcerations in other cases does limit the 
of credit for time served because there is only one condition in the statute: that 
defendant's prejudgment jail time was for 'the the defendant was convicted 
and sentenced for." Owens, 158 Idaho at 4. The plain, unambiguous language of 
I. § 18-309(1) mandates credit for "any period of incarceration" if this simple condition 
is Owens, 158 Idaho at 4 (citing I.C. § 18-309(1 )). Following the service of an 
arrest warrant for the state offenses, Mr. Naii was incarcerated "for the offense[s]" until 
sentencing. I § 18-309(1 ). Pursuant to this plain, unambiguous language of I § 18-
13 
), was 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
conviction and the memorandum decision and 
court's amended 
denying credit 
prejudgment time served and remand this case with instructions to the district court to 
him 316 days of credit for his prejudgment 
this 28th day of December, 2015. 
JJ C. SWINFORD 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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